









• Belgium is a welfare state with a long history
• Challenges in the field of social protection
abound – some are new and crisis‐related,
and some well‐known (demographics)
• Numerous issues arise – too much for this
session








• The level of income taxes and social
contributions is high in Belgium, both in
nominal and effective terms
• Belgium has extremely progressive tax
system: with very high marginal tax rates

























1. Levels of taxation (and contribution) are top
of the league
2. Severe limitations to work incentives
– This has consequences for innovation and
emigration/ immigration!
– The tale of “higher productivity in Belgium than
elsewhere” does not help!
But it doesn’t stop here, the reality is much





3. These are “average” results, along a series of
dimensions.
– Marginal net taxes are at much higher levels.
– Complicated tax and contribution rules combined with
large differences across individuals lead to very diverse
effective taxation and incentives.
• Some may be desired, some not...
– “Organized” optimization of the tax pressure by means of
lunch vouchers, company cars, etc.
• The political room for maneuver is very limited by size








• Belgium, has been shifting towards less contributory
philosophy as a result of political choices
• The current social insurance system is
– A multitude of actors and regimes, with complicated interactions
– Numerous minima and maxima breaking the link at the
contribution and benefit stage, completed by very large role of
non‐contributory periods
– A budgetary management based on revenue pooling, the so‐
called “Global Management” by the RSZ‐ONSS
• E.g., for wage‐earners, no more dedicated/earmarked contributions!
– An increasing role for complementary financing through indirect
taxation, also implemented by RSZ‐ONSS






• The explicit link between contributions and
benefits is weak (or absent) in Belgium!
– It is not only the size and deficit of the programs that
matter, but also how financed!
• Notions of generosity, actuarial fairness, etc.
– Important consequences for decision‐making
• Notion of actuarial neutrality, etc.
• True at the system and the individual level –
though to separate degrees.
– Incentives for individuals to work (and contribute).
– Incentives for managers and political decision‐makers















• This logic is less theoretical than it seems
– See the idea behind Swedish‐style notional
defined contribution (NDC) pension reforms
• Restore link between income‐dependent taxes and
income‐dependent benefits
• It remains a Pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) system, but with links
between contributions and benefits
– See also the decisions in Germany in the recent
past about changing the financing of the health




• None of the Belgian social insurance agencies is
responsible for both incomes and expenditures
– Essentially it is a system of spending agencies, with
annually determined spending requirements that
have to be met by RSZ‐ONSS
• Very limited (none?) automatic stabilizers in the
system as there are no explicit feedback
mechanisms
– Mostly discretionary policies possible
• Key competencies split between different
actors/levels





















Share of contribution financing in social security (left scale)



























































1980 1985 1987 1991 1994 2001 2007
Year
 40-44  50-54














1980 1987 1994 1997 2001 2007
Year
 40-44  50-54




















1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Circulatory Muskoskeletal Endocrinal Mental health







1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Circulatory Muskoskeletal Endocrinal Mental health

























1982 1985 1987 1992 1995 1997 2002 2007
Year
 40-44  50-54











1982 1985 1987 1992 1995 1997 2002 2007
Year
 40-44  50-54




















































• Need for comprehensive approach, not
segmented!
– Simplifying the architecture would help
• Communicating vessels, requiring a solid







• A selective approach, if only because of
financing limits
– Not all spending is desirable or efficient
– Some of this public expenditure simply crowds
out private provision (unemployment
insurance, etc)
– Public expenditures might generate future
demand for more public expenditures





• Smarter system design, with automatic
feedback mechanisms
– Exploit the tax‐benefit link to make the system
less distortive and more sustainable/credible.
• Simplification of system architecture, to
simplify job mobility and system operations –
both for administrators and participants
• Comprehensive reform needed, with effective
gate‐keeping mechanisms
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